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Abstract 
   Purpose. Although medical decision making is typically a collective process, Quality-Adjusted 
Life-Years (QALYs), the preferred outcome measure for cost-utility analyses (CUA), are 
typically derived from individual preferences over health episodes only. This paper reports the 
first empirical investigation into the effects of collective decision making on QALY 
methodology, using both time trade-off (TTO) and standard gamble (SG) tasks.  
   Methods. We investigated collective decision making in dyads, by means of a mixed-subjects 
design. Two experimental conditions were used: individual decision making (IDM) and 
collective decision making (CDM). For subjects in both conditions (n = 163), a baseline 
measurement for both SG and TTO was obtained for three mild health states, described by means 
of EQ-5D. Next, subjects completed either a filler task (IDM) or a group measurement (CDM) 
for the same health states, followed by another individual measurement to determine whether 
learning effects occurred. 
   Results. Our data suggested that collective decision-making has little to no effect on: 1) 
decision quality, and 2) decision outcomes. More specifically, no systematic discrepancies 
between CDM and IDM were observed in terms of consistency and monotonicity for both 
methods. Furthermore, SG and TTO utilities remained similar across conditions, and the typical 
difference in elicited utilities between these methods was not affected.  
   Conclusions. These findings suggest that consulting with others has little effect on preferences 
with regard to health outcomes in SG and TTO, although learning effects may occur. This 
conclusion could be relevant for health state valuation studies, which increasingly utilize 
personal interview strategies. Additionally, our findings add to the literature of the de-biasing 
effect of collective decision-making, suggesting that no such effect occurs for SG and TTO. 
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1. Introduction 
Medical decision making, such as when patients decide between different surgical procedures or 
medical therapies, is typically embedded in a collective process. Although usually individual 
health outcomes are at stake, decisions about health are frequently made in consultation with 
significant others, such as spouses, children and medical professionals. Such shared medical 
decision making is commonly seen as the ideal model of treatment decision making (1). This 
collective feature of medical decision making is, however, not well-documented within the 
economic literature on health outcomes research. This line of research deals directly with the 
valuation of outcomes of treatment decisions, but to our knowledge empirical work comparing 
individual and collective decision making for outcome measurement is scarce, if not non-
existent. That is, Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs), the preferred outcome measure for cost-
utility analyses (CUA), are defined over individual preferences only, without explicit 
consultation of (significant) others.  
 The QALYs attributed to health outcomes are obtained by multiplying the duration of the 
outcomes by quality weights, which represent the health-related quality of life of these outcomes. 
These quality weights, which are normalized such that 0 represents the subjective weight or 
value of death and 1 reflects full health, are typically determined through choice-based 
methodologies (2), such as discrete choice experiments (DCE), standard gamble (SG) or time 
trade-off (TTO). These health state valuation (HSV) methods are for example used to elicit 
quality weights for disease-specific health profiles, e.g. dementia (3), colorectal cancer (4) and 
liver disease (5), but also within more general health state utility frameworks such as EQ-5D or 
SF-6D (6–11). Perhaps unsurprisingly, as standard health economic theory is relatively silent on 
collective decision making, these methods are typically applied to the individual case, with 
subjects in HSV studies deciding about their own (hypothetical) health outcomes (7,12). 
Compiling such individual preferences for health outcomes from a general public sample enables 
the estimation of QALYs from the societal perspective, which is, the reference case in CUA (13). 
Nonetheless, the focus on shared medical decision making in clinical practice (14,15), and the 
increasing uptake of personal interviews in large HSV studies (as advocated by the EuroQoL 
Group (7,16)), lead to question how choice-based QALY methodology is affected by moving 
beyond purely individual decision making. In the present paper, we report the results of a first 
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empirical investigation into the effects of collective decision making on HSV methodology, 
specifically on SG and TTO methods used to measure generic health state utilities.  
  Our focus is on how collective decision making affects QALY weights; i.e. on the effect 
of deciding collectively on SG and TTO decisions’ quality, outcomes and processes. As is well-
documented in the health economic literature, QALY weights usually differ between these two 
methods (17–19). Typically, SG weights, obtained through subjects’ decisions between staying 
in a less-than-perfect health and gambling for full health, are higher than TTO weights, which in 
turn are derived from the years of less-than-perfect health subjects are willing to trade off to 
obtain full health. Bleichrodt (20) proposed that the different outcomes produced through these 
methods can be understood as resulting from inaccurate assumptions with regard to analyzing 
choices within the SG and TTO method. Conventionally, the difference between SG and TTO 
was explained as resulting from deviations from the linear QALY model, which has been found 
to be descriptively inaccurate (21,22). Bleichrodt (20) noted that this explanation is incomplete, 
since it is based on expected utility (EU) theory, and proposed that the difference between SG 
and TTO could also result from biases, i.e. descriptive violations of EU theory (as modeled by 
scale compatibility and prospect theory). Specifically, Bleichrodt (20) postulated that SG will be 
biased upwards as a result of loss aversion and probability weighting, while TTO is biased 
upwards due to loss aversion and scale compatibility, and is negatively affected by discounting. 
Only recently, empirical work has tested Bleichrodt’s (20) predictions, and demonstrated 
that when most of these biases are measured independently and accounted for, SG and TTO no 
longer produce different QALY weights (23). However, currently no consensus exists on how 
these biases are best measured or corrected for. A different strategy could be to instruct 
individuals to complete SG and TTO in groups, because earlier research using monetary 
outcomes has documented that collective decision making may have debiasing effects for both 
risky and delayed outcomes. For example, collective decision making has been associated with 
less impatience (24), and fewer dynamic inconsistencies (25). Other studies give less firm 
results, with mixed evidence being reported for risk aversion (26–30), ambiguity aversion 
(26,31,32) and the violation rate of EU (33–35). Research on household decision making 
demonstrated that couples’ risk attitudes deviate from EU to a lesser extent when couples decide 
together, although probability weighting is still observed (33). On the other hand, an extensive 
psychological literature exists suggesting that in some cases detrimental effects of group decision 
5 
 
making can be observed, for example when groups engage in ‘groupthink’. In some cases, 
collective decision making will foster limited information search and enhanced confirmation bias 
(36,37). As such, under the current state of the literature, it is unknown whether completing SG 
and TTO in groups will decrease the effect of biases.  
Our study adds to the medical decision making literature in several respects. First, we 
report the first empirical investigation into the debiasing effect of collective decision making on 
SG and TTO. To this end, we compare (the difference between) SG and TTO estimates between-
subjects for groups and individuals, and allude to the debiasing effect of collective decision 
making. Second, our experiment allows us to disentangle the effect of collective decision making 
from a mere learning effect. We obtain, for each subject, a baseline measurement for SG and 
TTO, after which we distinguish between groups and individuals. Groups will engage in 
collective decision making, while individuals will repeat the SG and TTO measurement 
individually. As such, we are able to isolate the effect of learning from any difference between 
collective and individual decision making. Finally, we test whether any possible debiasing 
effects of collective decision making carry over into a final post-measurement for groups.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 covers our theoretical 
framework and necessary notational conventions, while sections 2.2 introduces methodology and 
the experimental procedure. In section 3 the results are presented, whilst section 4 features a 
discussion of these results and concludes. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1.  Theoretical framework and notation 
In this paper, we only consider chronic health profiles described as (𝑄, 𝑇), with 𝑄 denoting 
health status and 𝑇 denoting its duration in years. For brevity, we denote immediate death as 𝐷 
and if health status is equal to full health (𝐹𝐻) we write 𝑄 = 𝐹𝐻. Under the assumption of 
completeness, decision makers are able to form preferences over health profiles, denoted using 
the conventional notation: ≻, ≽, and ∽ to represent strict preference, weak preference, and 
indifference, respectively. Most studies applying SG or TTO assume that decision makers form 
these preferences as modeled within the linear QALY model, i.e.:  
 𝑉(𝑄, 𝑇) = 𝑈(𝑄) ∗ 𝑇,                 (1) 
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Decision makers decide about health profiles, either under certainty (in case of TTO) or under 
risk (in case of SG). Risk is operationalized by presenting decision maker with lotteries of the 
following form: (𝑄0, 𝑇0)1(𝑄2, 𝑇2), which signifies that health profile (𝑄0, 𝑇0) will be realized 
with probability 𝑝, and health profile (𝑄2, 𝑇2) with probability 1 − 𝑝.  
The SG method involves determining probability p at which decision makers are 
indifferent between a sure outcome (𝑄, 𝑇67), and a risky prospect (𝐹𝐻, 𝑇67)1(𝐷). In other 
words, QALY weights are determined by asking subjects to choose between a number of years 
(𝑇67) in health state Q for certain and a gamble with two outcomes, which are FH during the 
same time period (𝑇67), and D. Typically, p is varied until the respondent is indifferent between 
the two alternatives. These SG indifferences are typically evaluated under expected utility (EU) 
theory (38). The TTO method, on the other hand, asks for a time equivalent in perfect health 
which yields indifference between (𝑄, 𝑇8890) and (𝐹𝐻, 𝑇8892), with 𝑇8890>𝑇8892. In other 
words, subjects are required to compare 𝑇0 years in health state 𝑄 to 𝑇2 years in 𝐹𝐻. The number 
of years 𝑇2 in 𝐹𝐻 is varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two options. 
Given the assumptions listed above, and setting U(𝐹𝐻) = 1	&	𝑈(𝐷) = 0, the SG 
indifference (Q, 𝑇67)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇67)1(𝐷) is evaluated by: 𝑈(𝑄) ∗ 𝑇67 = 𝑝 ∗ (1 ∗ 𝑇67) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 	0, (2) 
and, thus: 𝑈(𝑄) = 𝑝.  
The TTO indifference (Q, 𝑇8890)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇8892) is evaluated by: 𝑈(Q) ∗ 𝑇8890 = 1 ∗ 𝑇8892, (3) 
and, thus, we obtain 𝑈(𝑄) = 𝑇8892/𝑇8890. 
 
Bleichrodt (20) proposed that the typical differences between SG and TTO weights may result 
from biases not accounted for in EU theory or the linear QALY framework, such as discounting, 
loss aversion and probability weighting. Thus, by evaluating SG and TTO without 
acknowledging these biasing influences, we should observe a gap between SG and TTO. If 
collective decision making has debiasing effects on SG and TTO, this gap could decrease, which 
we test empirically. 
 
2.2. Experiment 
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Two experimental conditions were used: individual decision making (IDM) and collective 
decision making (CDM). The main experiment consisted of three parts: Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3, 
with the experimental conditions IDM and CDM only differing in Part 2. The first part served to 
establish a baseline measurement for SG and TTO utilities. In the second part, subjects in the 
CDM condition completed SG and TTO again, whilst discussing amongst each other. Subjects in 
the IDM condition completed a filler task, which was not related to health states, risk or lotteries, 
to avoid confounding effects. The questionnaire featured the adaptation by Rohde (39) of 
Ameriks and colleagues’ (40) measure of self-control problems. The results of this filler task are 
not covered in this paper. In the final part, we established a post-measurement to determine 
whether learning (IDM) or spillover effects (CDM) occurred, by presenting all subjects with one 
final repetition of SG and TTO utility elicitation (see Table 1 for an overview of the two 
conditions). SG and TTO utility weights were obtained by means of a choice list for three health 
states (see Appendix A and B for instructions and screenshots). The same ordering was used 
within each part: SG choice lists were completed before TTO choice lists. To test for 
consistency, a single SG choice list was repeated in Part 1 and Part 3, and also for the collective 
measurement in CDM. 
 
Table 1. Overview experimental conditions. 
  Between-subjects comparisons 
 Condition IDM (n = 65) CDM (n = 98) 
Within 
subjects 
Part 1 Individual SG and TTO (I1) Individual SG and TTO (I1) 
Part 2 Filler task (F) Collective SG and TTO (G) 
Part 3 Repetition of Individual SG and TTO (I2) Repetition of Individual SG and TTO (I2) 
 
2.2.1. Sample and procedure 
A total of 163 students (78 female) of the Rotterdam School of Management participated in this 
experiment, with a mean age of 19.37 years (SD = 1.57). Experimental sessions lasted for 
approximately 55 minutes, and subjects were rewarded with course credits for their participation. 
In total, 98 (49 dyads) participants took part in the CDM condition, and 65 in the IDM condition. 
The experiment was run on computers in sessions of up to four subjects sitting adjacently in 
separated cubicles. The experiment was programmed in Matlab, and instructions were provided 
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on a separate sheet (see Appendix A). An instructor was present at all times to answer any 
questions subjects might have with regard to the procedure. Subjects were explicitly instructed to 
refrain from discussing with each other, with the exception of the group part of the experiment in 
the CDM conditions. In this Part 2, subjects in the CDM condition were seated together at one 
computer and were instructed to discuss until they arrived at one answer that was satisfactory for 
both of them. Furthermore, they were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that 
they should go through the experiment at their own pace. When subjects finished Part 3, several 
demographics and additional variables were collected. 
 
2.2.2. Health state descriptions 
Health state descriptions for SG and TTO were obtained from the EQ-5D-5L classification 
system (41). The EQ-5D-5L distinguishes between five health domains, i.e., ‘‘mobility’’, ‘‘self-
care’’, ‘‘usual activities’’, ‘‘pain/discomfort’’, and ‘‘anxiety/depression’’. Within these domains, 
this taxonomy uses five health state levels from ‘‘no problems’’ to ‘‘extreme problems/unable 
to’’. In EQ-5D nomenclature, health states are represented by 5 digit codes like 22113. This 
example features as a label for a health state with: slight problems (i.e. level 2) with mobility and 
self-care, no problems with the usual activities and no pain/discomfort (i.e. level 1), and 
moderate anxiety/depression (i.e. level 3). Four health states were utilized in the SG choice lists 
and TTO choice lists, one of which was only utilized in the practice list (𝑄1: 41321). The 
remaining three health states reflected an array of mildly aversive health states, in order to avoid 
health states that could be considered worse than death (42). Additionally, the health states were 
monotonically increasing in severity, i.e. each consecutive health state featured more severe 
problems on at least one domain and was identical otherwise. The following health states were 
used: 11221 (’high’), 21222 (’middle’) and 32322 (’low’), which we denote 𝑄0, 	𝑄2	and 	𝑄A. In 
other words, if 𝑇0 = 𝑇2 = 𝑇A, assuming monotonicity, we should obtain (𝑄0	, 𝑇0) ≻ (𝑄2	, 𝑇2) ≻(𝑄A, 𝑇A). Subjects completed SG and TTO choice lists for 𝑄0, 	𝑄2	and 	𝑄A in the same order for 
each part of the experiment. To familiarize subjects with the health states in this experiment, 
before being presented with the choice list elicitation, subjects were required to rate Q1, Q2 and 
Q3, alongside death on a scale between 0 and 100, where 100 represented full health.  
 
2.2.3. Measurements for SG and TTO 
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To familiarize subjects with the choice list elicitation, they completed a practice session for both 
SG and TTO. For choice lists based on the SG method, subjects were faced with a choice 
between two alternatives. Alternative A would make them certain to live 50 more years in the 
indicated health state (𝑄1, 𝑄0, 	𝑄2	or	𝑄A), after which they would die. If they chose Alternative B, 
they would be taking a gamble. The following instruction was used to clarify the risk of 
Alternative B: ‘On the one hand, you have the chance (100 × 𝑝%) of living 50 more years (𝑇67) 
in full health (i.e. no problems on any dimension), after which you will die, but on the other 
hand, you have a chance (100× (1 − 𝑝)%)of dying within a week’. Subjects faced choice lists 
of 10 choices in which Alternative B varied; more specifically, 𝑝 increased. For each elicitation, 
a two-pronged approach was used. First, 𝑝 varied in increments of 10%, between 0% and 100%. 
After a switching point was obtained at this level, a second choice list was presented, which 
elicited a probability at the percentage point. For example, if a subject switched at 𝑝 = 80% in 
the first choice list, she would face a second choice list that varied between 70% and 80% with 
increments of 1% (see Appendix B for screenshots). 
For choice lists based on the TTO method, Alternative A was the same as for the SG 
method, i.e. living 50 more years (𝑇8890) in the indicated health state (𝑄1, 𝑄0, 	𝑄2	or	𝑄A), after 
which they would die. If they choose Alternative B, they would live 𝑇8892 more years in full 
health (i.e. no problems on any dimension), after which they would die. A similar two-step 
elicitation procedure was in place, where, in the first choice list, 𝑇8892 varied between 0 and 50 
years, with 10 increments of 5 years. In the second choice list, the indifference point of the first 
list was continued, and a more precise estimate was obtained by presenting subjects with a 
choice list with 10 increments of 0.5 year. For example, if a subject switched from A to B at 𝑇8892=35 years, she would face a choice list with Alternative B varying between 30 and 35 with 
0.5 year increments (see Appendix B).  
 
3. Results  
We present the results of our experiment on the following domains of decision making: a) 
decision quality, b) decision outcome, and c) decision process (a full transcript of our analyses 
can be found in the online supplements to this article). 
3.1.  Data analyses 
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Each of these decision domains was first analyzed by direct comparisons (i.e. t-tests) at the 
aggregate level between sessions and conditions. Second, we applied more advanced analyses to 
the parts on decision quality and decision outcomes, in order to i) determine if collective decision 
valuation of SG and TTO influences decision making up and above mere learning, and ii) 
estimate if collective decision making improves subsequent individual decision making. The 
former approach is referred to as a ‘group effect’, while the latter is referred to as ‘carryover 
effect’. For the group effect we compared the group answers in the CDM condition (CDM: G) to 
the repeated individual answers in the control group (IDM: I2). Thus, this comparison consisted 
of the second time subjects completed SG and TTO utility weights for both conditions, while 
individuals in CDM completed this second round in groups. To estimate the group effect, we ran 
generalized linear mixed effect regressions (LMER) with subject random effects and the 
following fixed effects included: i) learning – dummy indicating whether it concerned a first or 
repeated session , ii) treatment – IDM or CDM, iii) method – SG or TTO and iv) group – 
interaction term for learning and treatment. The carryover effect was estimated similarly, where 
we instead compared CDM: I2 and IDM: I2 to their respective baseline. To estimate this 
carryover effect, we ran a similar LMER, with the same fixed effects included; i.e., i) learning, 
ii) treatment, iii) method, and iv) carryover – interaction term for learning and treatment. These 
analyses were performed with R using the LMER package. For the sake of brevity, we will not 
present full model statistics for these analyses, but only report fixed effect estimates (FEE) and 
standard errors (SE) in Table 2. 
Table 2. Fixed effect 
estimates (standard 
errors) for LMLR 
analyses for both group 
and carryover effects  
Decision quality Decision outcome 
 Consistency Monotonicitya ΔTariffb Δ(SG-TTO) 
     
Group effect : IDM: I1 vs. I2 | CDM: I1 vs G 
Constant 8.87 (2.02) *** 1.09 (0.65) + 0.13 (0.03) *** 0.06 (0.02) *** 
Learning -1.68 (1.25) 0.64 (0.44) -0.04 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.01) 
Treatment: CDM 0.15 (2.59) -2.75 (1.03) ** 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 
Method: TTO   0.42 (0.28) 0.03 (0.01) ***  
Group: 
(Learning*Treatment) 
-0.74 (1.61) 2.38 (0.86) ** -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Health state: middle   -0.04 (0.01) *** -0.04 (0.01) *** 
Health state: high   -0.08 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) *** 
     
Carryover effect : IDM: I1 vs. I2 | CDM: I1 vs I2 
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Constant 8.87 (1.99) *** 1.32 (0.69) + 0.12 (0.03) *** 0.06 (0.02) * 
Learning -1.68 (1.22) 0.67 (0.45) -0.04 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.01) 
Treatment: CDM -1.35 (2.30) -0.51 (0.82) 0.03 (0.03)  0.01 (0.03) 
Method: TTO  0.42 (0.26) 0.03 (0.01) ***  
Carryover 
(Learning*Treatment) 
0.76 (1.31) 0.12 (0.55) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)  
Health state: middle   -0.04 (0.01) *** -0.03 (0.01) *** 
Health state: high   -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) *** 
Note: *,**, and *** represent significance at p < 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively. + indicates marginal 
significance at 0.05< p <0.10.   a binomial regression,  b difference between each utility weight and its 
Dutch Tariff for EQ-5D-5L (Versteegh et al., 2016) 
 
3.2.  Decision quality 
We analyzed decision quality by determining the effect of collective decision-making on our 
consistency checks and monotonicity of SG and TTO valuations (see Appendix C for results on 
precision and completion times of SG and TTO). 
3.2.1. Consistency 
Consistency on repeated SG choices was adequate for all individual tasks (I1 and I2 for both 
IDM and CDM), with no significant difference between original and repeated elicitation (t-tests, 
p’s>0.07). However, consistency was lower for collective decision making, with significant 
differences existing between original and repeated decision making (t-test, p<.001). Next, we 
applied our analytical approach on the absolute difference between original and repeated 
measurements; hence, we estimated the group effect and carryover effect for consistency (see 
Table 2). Considering consistency checks were only applied to SG, we drop fixed effects for 
method in both analyses. We found no significant effects in both our analytical approaches.  
3.2.2. Monotonicity 
We determined for each subject if utility weights for Q1, Q2 and Q3 were monotonically 
increasing (i.e. if no violations of monotonicity occurred). A large majority (81% to 100% 
depending on session) of our subjects assigned monotonically increasing utility to all health 
states. Next, we applied our approach to estimate the group and carryover effect for monotonicity 
(see Table 2). Subjects were classified as either violators or non-violators, hence we applied a 
linear binomial mixed effect model instead of LMER. First, when estimating the group effect, we 
observe significant effects for: a) treatment and b) group. This indicates that: a) although 
sampling was random, monotonicity was lower overall for subjects in CDM, and b) 
monotonicity increased for collective decisions above and beyond learning. No effects of 
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learning or method were observed. Second, when estimating the carryover effect, we found no 
significant fixed effects. 
 
3.3. Decision outcome 
We analyze decision outcomes using a similar analytical approach, with a focus on both absolute 
utilities elicited with SG and TTO, and the relative differences between these methods.  
3.3.1. Utility weights for SG and TTO 
Figure 1 presents the main results on SG and TTO utilities. Several within-subjects trends at the 
aggregate level can be observed from this figure. First, for many elicitations utility weights 
appeared to increase after repetition, with significant within-subjects increases for 9 out of 18 
subsequent increases (all p’s < 0.049). Second, our utility weights for health states Q1, Q2 and 
Q3 appeared to be lower than the Dutch EQ-5D-5L tariffs for these health states (6), which have 
been estimated at 0.634, 0.742, and 0.852 respectively. We calculated a difference score between 
each utility weight and its respective Dutch tariff (denoted ΔTariff), which could be considered a 
benchmark. We found that these difference scores were significantly larger than 0 for all TTO 
weights (all p’s < 0.033), with the exception of the second repetitions for Q2 (IDM only) and Q3 
(both conditions). For SG, we observe utility weights closer to benchmark tariffs. For CDM, SG 
utility weights at baseline (I1) were significantly lower than the tariff for all health states (all p’s 
<0.001), while for IDM these were also (marginally) significant (all p’s <0.08). Subsequent SG 
utilities (session I2 and G) were often no longer lower than Dutch tariffs for both IDM and 
CDM, although this did not hold for Q1. These findings indicate that repetition and group 
decisions appeared to move utility weights closer to the benchmark tariffs, i.e. a trend of 
increasing utility weights was observed.  
  Next, we apply our analytical approach and estimate the carryover and group effect on 
the difference between utility weights and Dutch tariffs, where we ran models with health state 
included as fixed effect. For both these approaches, we found a significant effect for a) learning, 
b) method and c) health state dummies. These effects indicate that a) repetition reduces the 
difference between utility weights and tariff, b) TTO utility weights were more distant from 
Dutch tariffs and c) the difference between Dutch tariffs and our estimates were increasingly 
larger for more severe health states. No effect of treatment, group or carryover was observed, 
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indicating that the positive effect observed on aggregate appears not to be related to collective 
decisions.  
 
Figure 1: Mean utility weights split by method (SG vs. TTO), session (I1 vs. G vs. I2), health 
state (Q1 vs. Q2 vs. Q3) and condition (IDM vs. CDM), with colored dashed lines for Dutch 
tariffs (EQ-5D-5L).  
 
3.3.2. Difference between SG and TTO 
Next, we compared the difference between SG and TTO by session and health state (denoted 
ΔSG-TTO). We found consistent evidence of higher utilities for SG for TTO in health state Q1 
(paired t-tests, all p’s < 0.011), but no strong evidence for health state Q2 (only significant for 
CDM-I2, paired t-test, p <0.01) and Q3 (paired t-tests, all p’s > 0.11). We found the difference 
between SG and TTO for baseline measurements (CDM/IDM-I1) pooled across health states to 
be 0.03 (significantly larger than 0, t-test, p <0.001), suggesting that on average a difference 
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existed between SG and TTO at baseline. Next, we applied our analytical approach, to estimate 
group or carryover effects on this difference between SG and TTO (see Table 2). Only fixed 
effects for health states were significant, indicating that the difference between SG and TTO 
increased for more severe health states, and no beneficial effects of learning or collective 
decisions were observed. 
 
3.4.  Decision process 
Finally, we explored the collective decision-making process by analyzing decision dynamics 
within dyads completing the CDM task. We estimated to what extent group utility weights 
deviated from utility weights we observed for the group members at baseline (i.e. I1-CDM). At 
the aggregate level, a pattern in which the group elicitation falls in-between the two individual 
estimates is observed most frequently (see Table 4). Such a pattern suggests that a majority of 
groups reached a consensus somewhere in-between their individual estimates (except for TTO-
Q3). Nonetheless, outside consensus group utility weights (lower than min, higher than max) are 
not uncommon and represent between 28 and 43% of the groups, depending on health state and 
method. When we investigated within-group consensus (i.e. the proportion of consensus across 
methods and health states), we observed that groups reach consensus in almost two-thirds of 
elicitations (64.97%). Only two groups (4%) failed to reach consensus on any elicitation on both 
SG and TTO. We also found no effect of reaching a consensus or not carrying over into 
subsequent individual decisions in CDM-I2 (t-tests, all p’s > 0.18). 
 
Table 4. Decision process: Location of group utility weight compared to individual weights and 
median decision weight for high valuators (n = 49). 
 SG-Q1 SG-Q2 SG-Q3 TTO-Q1 TTO-Q2 TTO-Q3 
Location of utility weight       
Below the min 11 10 4 8 9 3 
Above the max 6 10 13 6 12 11 
At the min 2 2 4 4 2 4 
At the max 2 3 7 2 3 15 
In-between 28 24 21 29 23 17 
Decision weight 0.43 0.64 0.89 0.44 0.72 1.00 
Note: Min and max refer to the lowest and highest individual valuation, respectively. 
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Next, we estimated the decision weight associated with the highest individual utility in a given 
group, i.e. the high valuator, for a given decision. We obtained this decision weight by assuming 
that collective decisions were a weighted summation of individual utilities. In other terms, we 
calculated decision weight ∝E of the high valuator in group utility weights (GUW), by 
rearranging the following equation: 𝐺𝑈𝑊 =	∝E∗ 𝐼𝑈𝑊E + (1 − 	∝E) ∗ 𝐼𝑈𝑊I . Here, 𝐼𝑈𝑊E  and 𝐼𝑈𝑊I  reflect baseline utility weights for the high valuator and their partner who assigned lower 
utility to that health state, respectively. In this context, if ∝E > 0.5 the high valuator has more 
weight in decisions, while for ∝E < 0.5 the opposite holds. For the sake of clarity, we removed 6 
observations corresponding to the cases where the two individuals’ utilities were identical. Table 
4 shows that for the best health state (Q3), the group tended to follow the individual with the 
highest utility, whereas the opposite occurred for the worst health state (both for SG and TTO).  
 
4. Discussion 
There is an increasing interest in studies about shared medical decision making, where decisions 
about health outcomes are arrived at through collective deliberation (1). In this study, we report 
the first comparison of individual and such collective decision making for health state valuations 
obtained by SG and TTO. A design was employed in which baseline measurements for both SG 
and TTO were obtained for three mild health states. Next, either a filler task or a group 
measurement was completed, followed by another individual measurement to determine whether 
learning effects, group effects or carryover effects occurred. We analyzed the results of this 
experiment within three domains of decision making: decision quality, decision outcome, and 
decision process. 
We found no effect of collective decision making with regard to decision outcome, 
although beneficial effects of learning could be distinguished. We observed a trend of increasing 
utility weights for SG and TTO, both for collective decisions and for individual decisions. More 
sophisticated analyses indicated that this increase was related to learning, repetition of SG and 
TTO (either in groups or individually) increased utility weights, which could be seen as 
beneficial as this realized a movement towards those of the general population (6). The typical 
difference between SG and TTO was observed at baseline, although this was less apparent for 
the least severe health state. Again, a ceiling effect could provide an explanation for this relative 
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small gap between SG and TTO. Importantly, the gap between SG and TTO was unaffected by 
collective decision making, and no carryover effects were observed. Finally, we explored 
decision dynamics within collective decisions. We found that a majority of dyads reached 
consensus, meaning that SG and TTO utility weights in for their group fell in-between their 
baseline measurements. For both valuation methods, we observed that the weight the individual 
with the highest utility decreased with severity. This finding could explain the beneficial effect 
of collective decisions on monotonicity.  
Our results are reassuring for scholars and policy makers who have been applying health 
state utilities measured at an individual level to medical decision making problems, which in 
reality often is a collective process. Furthermore, the results indicate that health state valuations 
can better be improved by adding repetition and practice tasks than by implementing a collective 
choice task. The latter will be more expensive and burdensome, while generating similar effects 
as the former. 
Collectively, these results add to the evidence base on shared decision making using 
monetary outcomes. In agreement with the mixed findings of those studies, we do not find a 
substantial beneficial effect of collective decisions. However, earlier work on collective 
decisions for monetary choice suggested that groups discount the future less (24,25). Because 
discounting has a negative effect on TTO values (20), less discounting in the group treatment 
would cause lower TTO values. Hence, our results suggest that discounting of health outcomes is 
not affected by collective decision making; an alternative explanation would be that both 
discounting and loss aversion decrease in group tasks, which would neutralize each other (20). 
Our results also indicate that collective decision making does not alleviate the typical gap 
between SG and TTO, which is also partially explained as a result of discounting (20,43). Future 
research could therefore obtain separate measurements of discounting and loss aversion (and 
possibly also other traits such as scale compatibility and probability weighting) for health 
outcomes to test these possibilities.  
A drawback of this study was the use of a convenience sample of students, which limits 
external validity. This was expressed in the lower valuations we observed for TTO compared to 
those in the general population (6). Still, we feel this first test adds some important insights that 
can be used in follow-up studies. For one thing, the finding of a substantial learning effect in our 
student sample suggests that the inclusion of a sufficient number of practice rounds will be 
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necessary for a less-educated sample representative of the general public. Second, it would be 
interesting to investigate if our finding of a bias toward the value of the group member with the 
highest individual utility can be generalized to a more representative sample. Third, future work 
could replicate our test using married couples, or doctor-patient dyads, who are likely to make 
real-life medical choices together, increasing the realism of the choice situation.  
In sum, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this work. Most importantly, 
collective decision making does not appear to affect health state valuations compared to 
individual valuations, above and beyond learning. This is a reassuring result for previous work 
that has used individually obtained health utilities. Moreover, this suggests that including 
repetition could have similar beneficial effects as requiring personalized interviews for HSV (e.g. 
as advocated by EuroQoL in their EuroQoL Valuation Technology protocol (44)).. Second, the 
preference of the group member with the higher valuation in the individual task gets the highest 
weight in the group task, which implies that groups tend to behave conservatively regarding the 
sacrifice of time (TTO) and survival probability (SG). Finally, the difference between SG and 
TTO does not disappear when moving from an individual to a collective task, which suggests 
that collective decision making does not help to reduce cognitive biases such as probability 
weighting. Therefore, other solutions for alleviating these confounding effects, such as more 
elaborate instructions, practice rounds and correction mechanisms (23) should be considered if 
one aims to correct for these biases. 
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Appendix A: Example instruction for Part 1 
 
In part 1, you have to perform 2 tasks. 
Task 1 
Suppose you have to choose between 2 possible life scenarios, which are referred to as 
Alternative A and Alternative B.  In Alternative A, you will be certain to live 50 more years in 
the indicated health state, after which you will die. For example, suppose the health state is as 
given below: 
Your health state (P): 
-You have severe problems in walking about 
-You have no problems in washing or dressing yourself 
-You have moderate problems doing your usual activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family 
or leisure activities) 
-You have slight pain or discomfort 
-You are not anxious or depressed 
 If you choose Alternative B, you are taking a gamble. On the one hand, you have the chance 
(X%) of living 50 more years in full health (i.e. no problems on any dimension), after which you 
will die, but on the other hand, you have a chance (100-X %) of dying within a week. 
 The task consists of a number of lists of choices between the two alternatives. In every list, 
Alternative A remains the same, but Alternative B varies.  
As you move down the list, Alternative B becomes more attractive, and in some row, you will 
probably switch from Alternative A to Alternative B. If so, you will also choose Alternative B in 
all rows below that one, because in these Alternative B is more attractive. Similarly, if you 
choose Alternative A in a given row, you will also choose Alternative A in all rows above that 
one, because in these Alternative B is less attractive. The computer takes this into account and 
automatically selects Alternative B for all rows below the one where you choose Alternative B 
and Alternative A for all rows above the one where you choose Alternative A. 
There are no right or wrong answers, we are only interested in your choices.  
You can change your choices as often as you like. Once you are satisfied with your choices, click 
the “OK” button. Then you can no longer change your choices and you receive the next choice 
list. 
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Please now choose the alternative you prefer in each row. If you are ready, you get a prompt on 
your screen. At that moment, please read the instruction of Task 2 on the next page. 
Instructions Task 2 
Again, suppose you have to choose between 2 possible life scenarios, which are referred to as 
Alternative A and Alternative B. 
 In Alternative A, you will live 50 more years in the indicated health state, after which you will 
die. For example, suppose the health state is as given below: 
 Your health state (P): 
-You have severe problems in walking about 
-You have no problems in washing or dressing yourself 
-You have moderate problems doing your usual activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family 
or leisure activities) 
-You have slight pain or discomfort 
-You are not anxious or depressed 
If you choose Alternative B, you will live X more years in full health (i.e. no problems on any 
dimension), after which you will die. 
 Please choose the alternative you prefer in each row. This procedure is similar as in Task 1. 
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Appendix B: Screenshots of the experimental program  
Task 1: Standard Gamble 
 
Task 2: Time trade-off 
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Appendix C: Additional results on precision and completion time for SG and TTO 
Two additional elements of quality of decision making were analyzed, the precision of utility 
weights and the completion time for each elicitation. We also estimated the group and carryover 
effect for these decision elements, which can be found in Table C1. 
 
Table C1. Fixed effect estimates (standard errors) for LMER analyses for both group and carryover 
effects  
 Decision process 
 Precision Time 
   
Group effect : IDM: I1 vs. I2 | CDM: I1 vs G 
Constant 0.03 (0.01) *** 72.74 (3.86) *** 
Learning -0.004 (0.004) -15.91 (1.99) *** 
Treatment -0.005 (0.009) -17.37 (4.75) *** 
Method: TTO 0.01 (0.002)*** -12.91 (1.25) *** 
Group: (Learning*Treatment) 0.009 (0.005) + 15.32 (2.55) *** 
Health state: middle  5.54 (1.53) *** 
Health state: high  13.55 (1.53) *** 
   
Group effect : IDM: I1 vs. I2 | CDM: I1 vs G 
Constant 0.03 (0.01) *** 76.54 (2.65) *** 
Learning -0.004 (0.004) -19.89 (1.74) *** 
Treatment -0.001 (0.009) 4.49 (4.11) 
Method: TTO 0.01 (0.003) *** -13.65 (1.09) *** 
Carryover (Learning*Treatment) 0.006 (0.005) -6.53 (2.24) ** 
Health state: middle   6.34 (1.34) *** 
Health state: high  20.35 (1.34) *** 
Note: *,**, and *** represent significance at p < 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively. + indicates marginal 
significance at 0.05< p <0.10.  
 
C.1. Precision 
Precision was analyzed both between-subjects and within-subjects. For between-subjects 
comparisons, we apply Morgan-Pittman tests for equality of variances to compare between 
session variance within-methods. For example, we compare SG weight variance for state Q1 
between session I1 and session I2. These tests indicated the degree to utility weights were 
heterogeneous between sessions and health states. For IDM variances were not significantly 
different between I1 and I2 (Morgan-Pittman tests, all p’s > 0.16). If we repeat these analyses (I1 
vs I2) for CDM, we find a significant decrease (Morgan-Pittman tests, all p’s < 0.034) in 
variance, with the exception of the most severe health state Q3 for both SG and TTO (Morgan-
Pittman tests, p’s > 0.15).  For CDM, we observe significantly smaller variance between the first 
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individual session and group task (Morgan-Pittman tests, all p’s < 0.023). The estimation of 
fixed group or carryover effects is not possible, as these variance estimates reflect between-
subjects heterogeneity. Second, we obtain within-subjects estimates of precision by calculation 
of variance for utility weights associated with Q1, Q2 and Q3 (see Table C2). These analyses 
indicate to what extent collective decision-making affected dispersion of utility weights for each 
individual, i.e. if utility weights elicited in each session become more condensed or dispersed. 
Next, when we applied our analytical approach to estimate for the group effect and carryover on 
within-subject variance (see Table C1), we observed only a fixed effect of method, implying 
higher dispersion for TTO compared to SG. We observed no effects of learning, treatment, group 
or carryover effects of collective decision making.  
 
Table C2. Decision quality: Mean within-subjects variance and percentages of subjects 
satisfying monotonicity for each session 
 Session 1  Session 2 Session 3 
 I1-IDM I1-CDM  I2-IDM Group I2-CDM 
Variance for Q1, Q2, & Q3       
SG 0.024 0.030  0.022 0.035 0.034 
TTO 0.040 0.043  0.033 0.048 0.043 
 
C.2. Completion time 
Completion times were recorded for each session and separately for each health state within each 
session. Unsurprisingly, for our full sample baseline measurements took longer (5.5 minutes on 
average) than second individual measurements (little over 3 minutes on average), i.e. repetition 
decreased time needed for completion (t(294) =10.09 , p < 0.001). When we focused on subjects 
in CDM, we observed that group measurements (around 5.5 minutes) took approximately as long 
as baseline measurement (paired t-test, t(190) = -0.20, p = 0.84). When applying our analytical 
approach on within-subjects completion times, similar to our analyses on decision outcomes, 
fixed effects were also obtained for health states separately, to determine if completion times 
were affected by severity. In turned out that both when estimating the group and carryover effect 
almost all fixed effects were significant. The only fixed effect that was not significant was that of 
treatment in the carryover effects model (p=0.28). Collectively, these findings indicated that 
decision time consistently decreased: from TTO compared to SG, for repeated sessions, for more 
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severe health states. Furthermore, the group and carryover effect indicated that collective 
decisions took longer, while subsequent individual measurements were completed faster for 
subjects in CDM.  
 
